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CONSTRUCTIVE CONCERTED ACTIVITY AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS: THE NORTHERN METAL-INTERBORO SPLIT
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
The regulated economic system which characterizes life in this
country has not developed in the absence of potentially serious com-
promises with regard to the rights of the individual employee. Since
passage of the National Labor Relations Act1 in 1935, the emphasis
has been on the Act's endeavor to equate the bargaining position of
the employees as a group with that of their employer. Yet an employee
in an organized bargaining unit might desire to use the right given to
him by the Act of asserting grievances independently of union involve-
ment.2 Such a desire may arise from several motivations: for example,
the employee may fear that his union will intentionally use insufficient
effort in processing his claim.3 Alternatively there is the situation
where an employee is simply not entitled to union representation.4
Consequently, both the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
and the courts have been confronted with cases involving the individual
employee attempting to enforce a union-negotiated labor agreement.
Much of this litigation concerns the right guaranteed to employees
by section 7 of the Act "to engage in . . . concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... M
Section 8(a) (1) makes it an "unfair labor practice" for an employer
to violate an employee's section 7 rights.' Most litigation concerning
section 7 involves charges by employees of retaliatory discharge for
149 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
the Act].
229 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
3 See Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 YALI
L.J. 1215 (1964).
If a member employee feels that the union has not exercised "good faith" in attempt-
ig to process his grievance, he may file charges with the Board. See, e.g., Local 1,
Independent Metal Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). In addition, an aggrieved em-
ployee may file suit against either the union or employer in federal and state court
jurisdictions under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1970). See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
4 E.g., NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
5 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The Seventh Circuit has noted that the limiting phrase
"for mutual aid or protection" connotes action on the part of an employee which
identified him with the common interests of his fellow employees. NLRB v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1951). It should be noted that all "concerted activity"
need not be for "mutual aid or protection." The courts, however, have usually deemed
this second requirement of section 7 fulfilled by practically any indication of group
involvement. See text accompanying notes 69-73 infra. Indeed in many cases, the
requirement is not even discussed. See, e.g., NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388
F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). Consequently this Comment will not include an extensive dis-
cussion of the mutual aid requirement, presuming that it will generally be deemed
fulfilled once "concerted activity" is found.
629 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1) (1970).
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engaging in some form of "concerted activity.' 7 The consequences of
a finding of such "unfair labor practices, ' 8 have included reinstate-
ment of the discharged employee with full back pay,9 along with the
posting of appropriate explanatory notices.Y However, the Act gives
the employer rights as well as duties. An employer may discharge an
employee "for cause," and both the Board and the courts are pre-
cluded from abridging this right.1 Indeed, an employer may exercise
his discharge prerogative for "a good reason, a poor reason, or no
reason at all" so long as he does not interfere with an employee's
"concerted activity."" Furthermore, regardless of the protected
nature of any particular employee activity, if that employee is dis-
charged for any other "legitimate" reason, there is no violation of
the Act.'" But the employer's discretion is not absolute:
[T]he policy and protection provided by the National Labor
Relations Act does not allow the employer to substitute 'good'
reasons for 'real' reasons when the purpose of the discharge is
to retaliate for an employee's concerted activities.'4
Where the discharge of a single employee is at issue, the result-
ing dispute often deals with the ill-defined parameters of "concerted
activity." The concert requirement of section 7 could be enforced
according to its literal definition,'15 granting the Act's protection only
to those actions directly involving more than a single employee. The
courts, however, have demonstrated a reluctance to adopt such an
interpretation and, instead, have generally fastened upon more ex-
pansive views. 6 Thus, in many contexts, the term has become more
7E.g., Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949). For a dis-
cussion of the historical development of the concept of "concerted activity," see Note, The
Requirement of "Concerted" Action under the NLRA, 53 CoLui:.. L. fv. 514, 515
(1953).
8E.g., Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 36 (1935).
9 See, Note, Back Pay Awards for Unfair Labor Practices Under the Taft-Hartley
Act, 62 YALE L.J. 488 (1953).
1OE.g., B. & M. Excavating, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 1152, 1161-62 (1965).
1129 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970): "No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement
of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment
to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause." Cf.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1936): "[T]he Board is not
entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when
that right is exercised for other reasons than . . . intimidation and coercion [of the
exercise of § 7 rights]."
12 NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America, 128 F.2d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 1942). Accord,
NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Arkansas Grain Corp., 392 F.2d 161, 167 (8th Cir. 1968); Steel Indus., Inc. v. NLRB,
325 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1963); Cusano v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir. 1951).
13 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958).
14Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1352 (3d Cir. 1969).
15WsExaR's NEw INxTENATiONAL DICrIONsARY 470 (3d ed. 1966) defines "concert"
as "agreement in a design or plan: union formed by mutual communication of opinions
and views: accordance in a scheme . . . . " This definition was quoted by the court in
NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971).
16See text accompanying notes 101-30 infra.
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a term of art than a factual description. Consequently, whether the
action of an individual employee has been accorded protection under
the Act has often turned on the court's interpretation of the purpose
and effect of such action and not upon the simple and more limited
question of whether there was, in fact, action "in concert.1
17
In the case of an individual employee's attempt at contractual
enforcement, without the support of a union, the question becomes
sharply defined. Indeed, the courts of appeals have differed as to
whether such activity should be deemed to be "concerted" within the
meaning of section 7. The Second Circuit,"" adopting the somewhat
"fictional" view of the Board,"9 has found the necessary element of
concert in the fact that the individual is attempting to enforce collective
rights as embodied in a contract. The Third Circuit rejects this view
and maintains that the concert requirement cannot fairly be read as
including such unitary action within its ambit.2° Whether the Third
Circuit's restrictive reading of "concert" is mandated by the Act, or
whether the "constructive" approach as promulgated by the Second
Circuit can be justified by either policy or precedent, is the question
to be resolved.
Certain policy considerations particularly bear on the "concerted
activity" question. In the words of a former chairman of the Board,
the policy of the Act is: "to protect the public interest by eliminating
certain barriers to peaceful relations between employers and em-
ployees ...."21 But the "concerted activity" problem raises doubts
as to whether this philosophy, aimed toward an easing of employer-
employee tensions, is furthered by adhering to the more traditional
approach of the Third Circuit. Whether the Act's protection should
turn solely on the presence of more than one grievant is naturally a
'.7 NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1958): "Regard-
less of whatever concerted activities the employees were engaging in, if they were
discharged for any other reason, the employer does not violate the Act. Thus, the motiva-
tion of the employer in ordering the discharge is the crucial element in establishing a
violation." For example, actions by employees which are unlawful, violent, or in
breach of contract are not accorded protection by the Act. NLRB v. Washington Alu-
minum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962). Nor are activities demonstrating insubordination,
disobedience, or disloyalty within the protection of § 7. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346
U.S. 464, 472-76 (1953). It is not always clear, however, where the line separating
protected concerted activity from unprotected concerted activity should be drawn. See
4 SxRAcUSE L. Rv. 377 (1953). See also Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted
Activities, 26 lwi. L.J. 319 (1951); Gregory, Unprotected Activity and the NLRA, 39
VA. L. REv. 421 (1953); Note, Unprotected Activity Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 3 UTAu L. Rxv. 358 (1953).
18NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
19See, e.g., Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516 (1962).
20 NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
21 Leedom, Introduction, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 191 (1960). But see Keyserling,
The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 199, 218
(1960), where the author argues that: "Senator Wagner's central argument for his bill
was always on the general social and economic grounds. He never valued the measure
primarily as a mere weapon for negating industrial strife .... "
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central policy consideration.2 Whether the purpose of the Act demands
that the established grievance procedures be followed is a second.3
In considering this, one needs to balance the benefits of not penalizing
the grievant who challenges an unresponsive system, against the po-
tentially destructive effect which large numbers of such cases would
have on labor-management relations. Consequentiy, whether the pro-
tection of the Act should be extended to include attempts at contrac-
tual remedy by individuals acting outside of union procedure, presents
a problem with important implications.
II. Interboro AND Northern Metal: THE
PROBLEM IN FACT
A. NLRB v. Northern Metal
This question was examined by the Third Circuit in the case of
NLRB v. Northern Metal Co.24 The Northern Metal Company (the
Company) had hired Davis, a laborer, for a trial period of thirty days,
consistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement be-
tween Northern Metal and the Union local.25 Davis was classified as a
"probationary employee" who, under the contract, was not entitied
to union representation until the thirty-day period expired.26
While no employee worked on Labor Day, all but probationary
employees were compensated for the holiday. Feeling that he was en-
titied to such pay under the contract, Davis began to make inquiries
about remuneration.
Davis' demands met with resistance from, and subsequently re-
sentment by, the Company. He was told by Max Rose, chief executive
officer of Northern Metal, that under the contract, probationary em-
ployees were not entitled to holiday pay. Following refusals by the
Union's local representatives to assist him, because he was not yet a
union member, Davis secured a copy of the bargaining agreement and
noted that nothing in its provisions expressly excluded non-union or
probationary employees from its benefits. He therefore renewed his
request to Rose for holiday pay, referring to the relevant provision
of the bargaining agreement. Rose again denied that Davis was en-
titied to such pay," and upon the departure of the employee, instructed
2 2 Commentators have pointed out the deficiencies of such a distinction: "[Elven
if the activities of an individual employee should never be protected, it hardly follows
that it is the distinction between one and two employees which best effectuates the
purposes of the Act. And it would scarcely follow at all if we assume a large industrial
plant employing thousands of people." Note, The Requirement of "Concerted" Action
under the NLRA, 53 CoLui. L. Rav. 514, 517 (1953).
23See text accompanying notes 83-89 infra.
24440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
2 5 Id. at 882.
26Id. at 882-83.
2 7 Although the contract did not, on its face, negate the possibility that probationary
employees were entitled to holiday pay, the company did not, as a long-standing practice
acquiesced in by the union, grant holiday pay to such employees. Id. at 883 n.3.
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the Company's financial secretary to prepare Davis' final paycheck.
When Davis inquired the next day about the cause for his discharge,
he was told by Rose that "he could not use a man who told him how
to run his business."8 Subsequently Davis filed charges with the Board,
alleging discriminatory discharge and seeking reinstatement with back
pay.
The specific problem which Davis' situation raised is whether or
not an individual employee is engaged in protected "concerted ac-
tivity" when attempting to enforce a provision of the bargaining agree-
ment to which he is subject. The Board found that Davis was in fact
discharged for pressing his demand for holiday pay to which he
thought himself entitled under the contract. 2 9 Consequently, the
Board concluded Davis' conduct was protected activity under the Act:
Grievances within the framework of a contract that affects all
employees are concerted activities; and it does not matter that
the employee may have been in error in his interpretation of
the contract. 30
The Board had taken a similar position for many years. In
Bunney Bros. Construction Co.,31 for example, an employee was dis-
charged for submitting to his employer a pay claim for "show-up"
time to which he felt himself entitled under the bargaining agreement.
In holding that such activity was protected by the Act, the Board ex-
plained that the discharged employee had "sought to implement the
collective bargaining agreement applicable to him as well as other
drivers and that the implementation of such an agreement by an
employee is but an extension of the concerted activity giving rise to
that agreement." 2 The Board had interpreted from a policy view-
point the concert requirement of section 7 in order to create what it
viewed as a better substantive result.33
The application of this rationale to the Northern Metal situation
28 Id. at 883.
2 9 Northern Metal Co., 1969 CCH NLRB DEC. f[ 20,810, at 26,358.
30 Id.
31139 N.L.R.B. 1516 (1962).
321d. at 1519. Accord, H.C. Smith Constr. Co., 1969 CCH NLRB Dec. fI 20,640;
B. & M. Excavating, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1152, 1154 (1965).
83 Several later Board cases expand upon this rationale. In New York Trap Rock
Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 374 (1964), the Board stated that neither the fact that an employee's
grievances might be numerous, nor his processing some himself while allowing the union
to process others, deprived him of the protection of the Act. In J.A. Ferguson Constr.
Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB DEc. 120,112, the Board found that the protection which § 7
accorded to an employee did not, in any way, depend upon that employee's adherence
to the specific form of the grievance procedure set out in the contract. Thus, for example,
the Board noted that:
Even assuming that Tolot's request was in derogation of the grievance provisions
of the contract, his conduct, nevertheless, constituted concerted activity since the
'grievance', pertained to a violation of a condition of employment prescribed
in the contract, affecting not only Tolot but also all the brick layers on the job.
Id. at 25,222.
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was clear. Davis' activity, the Board indicated, would ultimately con-
cern not only himself, but every employee similarly situated. Thus,
while he was attempting to enforce the holiday pay provision of the
contract solely for his own benefit, the results of his attempt would
have precedential value for all other probationary employees who
were employed under the same bargaining agreement. In this sense,
the action which Davis took in attempting to implement the contract
was "constructively concerted" and so deserving of protection under
section 7.
When Davis' employer appealed the Board's decision to the
court of appeals, however, the Third Circuit declined to follow the
Board's "constructive" approach. Although noting that a similar
rationale had recently been suggested by the Second Circuit in NLRB
v. Interboro Contractors, Inc.,84 the court, despite a strong dissent by
Judge Biggs, ruled that it could not adopt an interpretation of section
7 which constituted "a clear expansion of the Act's coverage, in the
face of unambiguous words in the statute. '35 In essence, the Third
Circuit was unwilling to adopt what they called the "fiction" of
viewing a single employee's actions as "concerted." Such a view, the
court reasoned, would not encompass a "sound interpretation of the
Act."36 Consequently, the court found that because Davis was acting
alone, without any indication of group support, he was not engaged in
"concerted activity" and so was not unlawfully discharged under
section 7. The fact that the avenue which Davis took in attempting
to process his grievance was the only one open to him under the
circumstances was not considered a relevant factor by the court.
B. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors
In March 1965, Interboro Contractors, Inc., hired John and
William Landers to work as steamfitters at a construction project
in New York City. When they arrived at the job site, the Landers
brothers discovered "the employer's adherence to the collective bar-
gaining agreement to be minimal.' 37 At various times over the next
three weeks, John Landers made complaints to both his employer and
the union to the effect that Interboro was not fulfilling its obligations
pertaining to safety measures as provided for in the contract;38 William
Landers and another worker named Collins made similar complaints
on other occasions 9 At one point, John Landers had considered the
34388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
35 440 F.2d at 884.
36Id.
37 Brief for Petitioner at 10, NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d
Cir. 1967).
38388 F.2d at 497-98.
39 Id.
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failure to provide a steamfitter partner of such consequence that he
refused to work until such a partner was provided for him.
Consequently both Landers were discharged for their activity and
they subsequently filed a complaint with the NLRB against their
employer. The Board, reversing the trial examiner, held that John
Landers' complaints constituted protected "concerted activity" and
ordered reinstatement. Before the Second Circuit, the Board argued,
inter alia, that John Landers' conduct was "concerted" within the
meaning of section 7 in that "his complaints-made in an attempt
to secure compliance with the contract-affected the rights of all
employees covered by the contract."40
After reviewing the facts in some detail, the Second Circuit
concluded that John Landers' complaints had not been for himself
alone. "[T]he testimony . . . shows," the court said, "that on several
occasions John was speaking for William and Collins as well as for
himself."41 Significantly, however, the court did not rest its holding
entirely on this finding, but went further to say that, in any event,
John's activities could be deemed "concerted" within the meaning of
section 7 regardless of whether other employees had joined in or
even been interested in his complaints:
[W]hile interest on the part of fellow employees would
indicate a concerted purpose, activities involving attempts
to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment may be deemed to be for concerted purposes even in
the absence of such interest by fellow employees. 2
This view formulates a doctrine of "constructive concerted activity"
whereby attempts to enforce collective rights are viewed as actions on
behalf of the group.43 Under the Second Circuit's approach, an em-
ployee retains the protection of the Act, even when acting solely for
his personal benefit, if he is attempting to implement rights collectively
formulated. 4 Thus, notwithstanding the explicit wording of the Act-
4 0 Brief for Petitioner at 11-12, NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495
(2d Cir. 1967). Somewhat surprisingly, the brief for respondent barely touched on the
question of whether Landers' complaints constituted "concerted activity." Rather, re-
spondent argued (1) that the motivation of the discharge was based upon justifiable
cause and not upon employee engagement in concerted activity, (2) that the Board did
not satisfy its burden of proving the motivation was based upon employee engagement
in concerted activity, and (3) that in fact it was not so based. To support these conten-
tions the respondent sought to invoke the ambit of Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230
F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1956), which relies on the employer's right "to exact a day's work for
a day's pay and to maintain discipline . . ." See also note 21 supra. By not attempting
to refute the Board's argument, respondent made it easier for the court to adopt the
Board's view.
41388 F.2d at 499.
42 Id. at 500.
48 This doctrine has been referred to as that of "concerted activity per se." NLRB v.
Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 887 (3d Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
44 " [1]t is doubtful that a selfish motive negates the protection that the Act normally
.gives to section 7 rights." 388 F.2d at 499.
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"concerted activities" 4 5-- and by viewing the enforcement of the con-
tract to be for concerted purposes, Interboro apparently extended the
protection of section 7 to include action whose concerted nature was
implicit rather than explicit.
A limitation on the farthest reaches of the Interboro decision was
clarified by the Second Circuit in NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co."
In that case several employees, believing that under the contract they
were entitled to additional compensation for working a split shift,
protested the absence of such remuneration and were discharged. In
finding the employees' activity to be within the protection of section
7, the court found occasion to explain its previous decision:
[W]e have recently said that an attempt by employees to
enforce their understanding of the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement is a protected activity under 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 if the employees have a reasonable basis for believing
that their understanding of the terms was the understanding
that was agreed upon, NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc.,
388 F.2d 495, 500, and n.7 (2 Cir. 1967)."
In reading Interboro as insisting on a reasonable basis for belief
on the part of employees (or a single employee) seeking to enforce an
understanding of the collective bargaining agreement, the court in
Langenbacher could rely on particular language used in the Interboro
decision:48
[T]he fact that the complaints were apparently reasonable
does support the conclusion that they were made for legiti-
mate union purposes and were not fabricated for personal
motives 9
The "reasonableness" requirement does not seem so much a
limitation on the general rule of Interboro as a guarantee that a par-
ticular employee's actions are, in fact, attempts to enforce the bar-
gaining agreement and not simply personal gripes. Through the
"reasonableness" proviso, the Second Circuit has, it seems, attempted
to prevent the protection of the individual enforcement of contract
rights outside of a union from becoming a wide-ranging protection of
all individual actions.5"
The differing theories in the Second and Third Circuits are based
45 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
46 398 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1968).
47 Id. at 463.
4 8 The court in Langenbacher indicated that it was not fashioning a new requirement.
Id.
49 388 F.2d at 500.
50 See note 17 supra; the Board does not seem to have formulated an equivalent
to the Second Circuit's requirement of "reasonableness." See, e.g., Northern Metal Co.,
1969 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 20,810; H.C. Smith Constr. Co., 1969 CCH NLRB Dec. II 20,640;
B. & X6. Excavating, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 1152, 1154 (1965).
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upon two different conceptions of how section 7 was meant to be
applied. The Interboro approach declines to place the rights of an
individual acting alone in jeopardy because of his failure to invoke
the union's grievance process-that is, because of his failure to act in
concert in the literal sense. Rather, in referring to "concerted pur-
poses," it defines the parameters of section 7's protection with regard
to the effect which an individual's action might have on other em-
ployees through enforcement of the contract. The Third Circuit has
rejected this "constructive" approach, arguing that the wide-ranging
scope of protection it entails does not serve to further the purposes
behind the Act.5 ' Rather, the Third Circuit requires that there be
"concerted activity" in fact (more than one grievant) or that the
single employee invoke the union grievance process and thereby make
the union his co-grievant in acting concertedly. By thus applying a
stricter interpretation of section 7, the approach in Northern Metal
attempts to fulfill the usually accepted definition of "concert.
' 52
While the Interboro approach is not free of potential difficulties, 53
the problems and inequities the alternative view necessitates for the
individual may well tip the scale toward the Second Circuit's rationale.
Whether such a conclusion is compelled by necessity, whether Inter-
boro's deficiencies justify the Third Circuit's rejection of it, or, indeed,
whether the concert clause itself has outlived its usefullness, furnishes
the basic inquiry in the following discussion.
III. THE JUDICIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
"CONCERTED ACTIVITY"
The courts' interpretation of the concept of "concerted activity"
defines the scope of protection afforded to the individual employee
with respect to his right to assert contractual grievances. Among the
questions which the courts have considered in defining the scope of
"concerted activity" is whether employees need involve a union in
their activities in order to be protected by section 7. The Fifth Circuit,
in determining that such involvement is not necessary, has set forth
its reasoning as follows:
Contrary to a rather general misconception, the National
Labor Relations Act was passed for the primary benefit
of the employees as distinguished from the primary benefit
to labor unions . . . . Consequently the right of employees
lawfully to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
mutual aid, outside of a union, is specified by the Act. 4
The federal judiciary has applied this reasoning to both non-union
51 440 F.2d at 884.
52 See note 18 supra.
53 See text accompanying notes 151-55 infra.
54 NLRE v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1945).
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employeesss and to employees who are union members, but who,
nevertheless, act independently of their union."
One qualification attached to section 7 protection upon a finding
of concerted activity is that it be for "mutual aid or protection," as
required by the Act.57 This phrase has been broadly interpreted, how-
ever, to include almost any activity which somehow affects the well-
being of the employees as a group. The Seventh Circuit, in NLRB v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company," included within the
protection of the Act a group protest concerning the employer's
frequent hiring and firing of different cashiers, a practice which
threatened to result in a loss of valuable time for some employees
whose earnings were partially dependent upon the rapid registering
of receipts. This and other like opinions50 indicate that if employee
action is somehow job-related, the "mutual aid" provision will be
deemed fulfilled. 0 Certainly, an attempt even by a single employee
to enforce his employer's adherence to the contract would seem to
satisfy the mutual aid requirement.
Concerted activities are protected only if the employer has some
knowledge of the protected nature of such activity before discharging
the employee. This view has been adopted both by the courts 1 and
by the NLRB.12 In defining the knowledge requirement, the Sec-
ond Circuit, while stating that employees need give neither formal nor
informal notice of their purpose to be protected by the Act, has held
that "where the employer from the facts in its possession could
reasonably infer that the employees in question are engaging in un-
protected activity, justice and equity require that the employees, if
they chose to remain silent, bear the risk of being discharged.2 3 The
Fifth Circuit also requires that an employer's liability be predicated
upon "at least some legally justifiable inference of employer knowl-
5 5 See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
5 6 See, e.g., Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (9th
Cir. 1953).
5 7 "The words 'concerted activities' are limited in meaning by the words with which
they are associated . . . ." Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752 (4th
Cir. 1949).
68 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948).
5 9 See, e.g., Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir.
1953).
60 The Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that the "mutual aid" proviso need not
be so narrowly construed as to require concerted activities to be related to the purpose
of collective bargaining. Morrison Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir.
1966).
6 1 E.g., NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964); NLRB v. Ford
Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1958). But see NLRB v. Office Towel
Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838, 842 (2d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion): "Nothing appears in
the statute to make this right [to engage in concerted activity] contingent upon notice
to, or knowledge by, the employer .... "; accord, 62 YALE L.J. 1263 (1953).
62 E.g., Walls Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 487 (1960), rev'd, 299 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (remanding case, D.C. Circuit criticized NLRB's strict interpretation of the knowl-
edge requirement); Myers Prods. Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 32 (1949).
63 NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 465 (2d Cir. 1958).
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edge .... )64
The implications of the knowledge requirement, as it touches the
Interboro situation, are unclear. The requirement is not discussed in
either the Northern Metal or Interboro decisions. Nevertheless,
even if the knowledge provision were mandated, the Interboro ap-
proach might be implemented without disturbing the requirement.
Although the court in Illinois Ruan Transport Corp. v. NLRB65 found
it unnecessary to consider this question, Judge Lay's dissent in that case
does attempt to deal with a closely analogous question. In response
to the employer's argument that he was not aware that the discharged
employee, in prosecuting a contract grievance, was acting for the
"mutual aid or protection" of other employees,"0 Judge Lay noted:
This argument ignores the obvious knowledge of respon-
dent as to the rights of all employees clearly written within
the collective-bargaining agreement. These rights do not
exist in a vacuum. It is well settled the employee need not
use the most reasonable form to express his grievance .... 67
This analysis suggests the argument that an employer should be
deemed to know the concerted nature of grievances concerning con-
tract rights. While such an argument embraces what might be called
a fiction, it nevertheless presents the basis for conciliation between the
knowledge requirement and the Interboro rule.
Section 9(a) of the Act6" may further complicate the question of
the applicability of section 7 to the individual grievant. In his dissent
in Northern Metal, Judge Biggs notes that through section 9(a) of
the Act "Congress has put its imprimatur on individual processing of
grievances."6 9 However, Judge Biggs explains neither the nature of the
interaction between section 9(a) and the rights guaranteed to em-
ployees in section 7, nor the possible implications of the various
interpretations of section 9(a).
As originally enacted, section 9(a) provided for an exception to
the principle of majority rule which the Act promulgated. Section
9(a) provided that "any individual employee or a group of employees
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their em-
ployer.""0 Although there was considerable debate concerning the
propriety of the majority representation principle, there is little
indication in the legislative history of the precise meaning attached
6 4 NLRB v. National Paper Co., 216 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 1954).
65 404 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1968).
66The discharged employee in Illinois R'uan Transport had attempted to implement
the driver safety provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 276.
6 7 1d. at 290.
6829 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
69 440 F.2d at 888.
"°National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), ch. 372, § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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to the right granted by this proviso.71 Consequently there arose in
the courts a considerable controversy concerning the implications
of the language used with regard to the role of the union in the
settlement of individual grievances.72
The nature of the debate was altered with the passage of section
9(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.11 This Act
added to the proviso, permitting individuals to present grievances to
their employer, the right
[T]o have such grievances adjusted, without the interven-
tion of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, that the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such adjustment.74
The legislative history of the 1947 provision offers some evidence
indicating that section 9(a) was intended to create an "indefeasible
right" of grievance prosecution for every employee.75 Some commenta-
tors have interpreted it this way.76 Since it has been established that a
grievance under section 9(a) may include any problem arising under
the collective bargaining agreement,77 the implications of the "inde-
feasible right" view are considerable. If this view were adopted, it
would entail a re-evaluation of the ambit of protection accorded to
"concerted activities." Certainly one can make a persuasive argument
that a single employee should be protected by the Act when attempting
to enforce an "indefeasible right" granted him by that Act. Assuming
71 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
7 2 For a discussion of the confficting views in the courts, see Donnelly v. United
Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 79-86, 190 A.2d 825, 834-38 (1963). See generally Cox, Some As-
pects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HaRv. L. REV. 274, 300 (1948);
Comment, Individual Employee Grievances Under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts,
1949 Wis. L. REV. 154.
73 Labor Management Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), amending
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), ch. 372, § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
7429 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). For a general discussion of the proviso, see Cox,
Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAB. L.J. 850 (1957);
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HAny. L. REv. 274
(1948) ; Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining,
50 COLr.ui. L. REv. 731 (1950); Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under
Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1214 (1964).
75 For a discussion of the legislative history of § 9(a), see Dunau, Employee Partici-
pation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 731, 744-46
(1950).
76E.g., Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Em-
ployer, 8 LAB. L.J. 316, 317-19 (1957); Report of the Committee on Improvement of
Administration of Union-Management Agreements, 1954, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 169-79
(1955). But see note 79 infra.
7 7 See, e.g., Douds v. Local 1250, RWDSU, 173 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1949) (L.
Hand, CJ.): "It then became the natural understanding that those 'grievances' which
could be 'adjusted' comprised all disputes which could be covered in a collective agree-
ment; and that meant every kind of dispute, for all disputes can be covered by a collective
agreement."
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such an "indefeasible right" existed, failure to support such an inter-
pretation would not only emasculate an employee's section 9 (a) rights,
but also would draw into question the very meaning of the Act's com-
mitment to employee freedom.
The federal courts, in holding that section 9(a) establishes only
a "permissive right" in the employer to hear individual gridvances, 78
have followed the view of most commentators79 and that of the
NLRB. 0 Their reasoning was best set forth by the Second Circuit:
The proviso was apparently designed to safeguard from
charges of violation of the act the employer who voluntarily
processed employee grievances at the behest of the individual
employee, and to reduce what many had deemed the unlim-
ited power of the union to control the processing of griev-
ances.
8
1
Thus, judge Biggs' reliance upon section 9 (a) in Northern Metal is of
questionable significance in view of the interpretation given to that
section by the courts.
8 2
This raises the question whether the court's interpretation of
section 9(a) may be undermined by the protection of "concerted ac-
tivity" offered by section 7. Where two employees rather than one
seek to present a grievance other than through the contract grievance
procedure, the permissive right interpretation of section 7 loses its
importance because the employees are protected by section 7.
This incongruity reinforces a conclusion that the courts have
formulated an interpretation of section 9 (a) which is at odds with the
seemingly clear meaning of that provision. Probably this results from
a fear that if every employee were given the right to present com-
plaints directly to an employer, the grievance machinery would break
down. However, since two employees will usually be protected in
complaining directly to an employer, a decision based upon such appre-
hension loses its force. As under section 7, the narrow distinction
between one and two employees does not seem to be a proper basis on
78 E.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 185
(2d Cir. 1962); accord, Broniman v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559, 562 (6th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 907 (1966). See also Note, Federal Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 YaE L.J. 1214, 1221-22 (1964).
79 Prior to the Wagner Act employers had no legal obligation to receive
grievances from individuals. Generally speaking, that act was not intended to
enlarge the rights of individuals, and the failure to provide any remedy for a
refusal to receive their complaints suggests that no enforceable right was intended
.. The office of a proviso is seldom to create substantive rights and obliga-
tions; it carves exceptions out of what goes before.
Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 624 (1956).
80The Board has ruled that § 9(a) grants only a "permissive" right. See, e.g.,
General Cable Corp., 20 LAn. ARm. 443 (1953).
81 Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 185 (2d Cir.
1962) (emphasis added).
82 See also Note, Section 9(a) of Taft-Hartley Act Confers on Employee No Right to
Compel Employer to Hear Individual Grievances, 63 CoLum. L. RFv. 1513, 1516 (1963).
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which to extend the Act's protection. Consequently, as a partial alter-
native to the Second Circuit "constructive" interpretation of section
7, the courts might reconsider interpreting section 9(a) as granting a
right of grievance prosecution to the individual employee. Perhaps by
limiting this right to those situations where the union is unwilling or
unable to aid the grievant, the courts can reconcile the problem of
possible subversion of the grievance procedure with the need to abolish
the often incongruous distinction between the positions of the individ-
ual and the group complainant.
IV. INDIvIDUAL ACTIVITY WHICH THE COURTs HAVE
PROTECTED AS CONCERTED
The courts have accorded protection under the "concerted ac-
tivity" clause to those individual employees who in particular ways or
under particular circumstances have registered grievances with their
employer. By examining a few of the more obvious examples of such
action, and by comparing these examples to the Interboro approach,
we can better evaluate the appropriateness of the Second Circuit's
view.
The expression of grievances in the manner provided for in the
collective bargaining agreement has marked one area of protected
section 7 activity. In NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp.,83 the Eighth
Circuit ordered the reinstatement of an employee who had been dis-
charged for filing a grievance alleging that her employer was not fol-
lowing certain contractual provisions in the assignment of overtime
work. The court reasoned that following the procedure established in
the contract for prosecuting a grievance based on that contract was
protected under the Act "because the collective bargaining agreement
is the result of concerted activities by the employees for their mutual
aid and protection. '84 The court seemed to find the necessary element
of concert in the union's indirect involvement, and to imply that
thereby the union became a co-grievant, and the employee's attempt
to assert her contract claim became a "concerted activity," effectively
involving all those who had ratified the contract procedure.
As noted by the dissent in Northern Metal, the only substantive
difference between Selwyn Shoe and Interboro was the Selwyn em-
ployee's utilization of the union grievance procedure.85 The NLRB
has gone beyond the Selwyn Shoe approach, reasoning that even con-
tract claims prosecuted "in derogation of the grievance provisions of
the contract" should be accorded protection under section 7 since a
decision upon such claims would affect other employees regardless of
83428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970).
8 4 Id. at 221.
85 440 F.2d at 887 n.1.
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the procedure used to express them."6 The language of the court in
Selwyn Shoe does not clearly refute this argument. The court stated
that:
The submission of a grievance based on the collective bar-
gaining agreement cannot be the basis for discharge. To
approve [the employee's] discharge would thwart the very
purposes of the Act-the promotion of harmony in labor-
management relations and the recognition of an individual's
right to organize for mutual protection and individual secu-
rity.
87
It is unclear why a grievance is to any greater degree "based on
the collective bargaining agreement" when it is expressed in an estab-
lished manner than when it is not. Secondly, it is questionable whether
"the promotion of harmony in labor-management relations" and the
"security" of the individual are put in greater jeopardy by a failure to
protect procedurally correct contract grievances than by a failure to
protect all contract grievances. It could be argued that following the
Selwyn Shoe approach is logically necessary because it represents not
only the enforcement of collective rights but, as well, enforcement in
a collectively agreed-upon manner. But the general policy of the Act
should not turn on such narrow distinctions. Perhaps more important,
certain individuals in positions analogous to that of Davis in Northern
Metal may be foreclosed from utilizing the union grievance process.
For such employees, the only other opportunity for asserting their
rights without risk of discharge would involve finding other similarly
situated employees with whom to act in concert. While the inability to
do so may well reflect the invalidity of the individual's grievance, it
may also reflect a situation which still warrants protection. Other
employees may be unwilling to join in the prosecution of another's
contract claim for many reasons: fear of employer retaliation; pre-
occupation with other matters; or failure to perceive the importance
of the grievance. Further, there are situations which elicit an em-
ployee's immediate protest without affording him an opportunity to
contact and persuade others to join him. 8 Each of these makes the
Selwyn Shoe approach inadequate as the sole touchstone for defining
the scope of protection which section 7 should accord to individual
grievants.
The decision of the Fifth Circuit, in Trailmobile Div., Pullman,
Inc. v. NLRB,89 marks a related area to which the courts have ex-
tended the Act's protection. In that case a union secretary, Green, had
attempted on various occasions to present grievances to the manage-
86 J.A. Ferguson Constr. Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. f1 20,112, at 25,222.
87428 F.2d at 221.
88 See, e.g., NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
89407 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1969).
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ment on behalf of other employees. One grievance centered around
Green's contention that welders were not being promoted from within
the plant ranks; on another occasion he complained of written repri-
mands being given to two fellow employees; and another involved the
seniority rights of an employee. The third occasion, involving the
welders, resulted in the plant superintendent issuing a written warning
to Green to the effect that Green was involving himself in matters with
which he was not personally concerned. The warning provided that no
further harassment of management representatives would be tolerated
even if it was necessary to discharge Green. The court, on these facts,
proceeded to find that the presentation of the grievances under the
circumstances was within the protective ambit of section 7 of the Act,
and that therefore section 8(a) (1) of the Act had been violated by
the threat against Green.
Again it appears likely that the court viewed the union as a co-
grievant with the individual, this time not because contract grievance
procedures were being used, but because the individual presenting the
grievance was a union officer. By thus involving the union (and by
implication all those individuals who comprise the union), Green
apparently was viewed as representing all those employees whose
interests he was pledged to protect, in his capacity as an officer of that
union.10
Application of the Trailmobile rationale does preserve to some
extent an orderly and predictable manner of processing grievances
where the complaint of a single employee is at issue. In such cases both
employer and employee are put on notice that if individual grievances
are pursued through union personnel, the courts will protect their
advocate under section 7. In other ways, however, this rationale serves
not to effectuate but to discourage the Act's purpose of preserving
industrial peace. That similar grievances-introduced by dissimilar
procedures-lead to differing outcomes will inevitably seem an injus-
tice to employees unfamiliar with legal procedure. Furthermore, grant-
ing protection to those individuals who are union representatives may
create a misleading impression in the eyes of the employees. By ex-
tending protection to one employee who happens to be a union rep-
resentative, but not to other employees acting singly, the courts seem
to accord the union a privileged position. They therefore tend to make
the union influential to a degree which may be undesirable. The prin-
cipal task of American labor unions has been to represent employees
and not to manipulate them; but by giving the single employee the
option of acting through the union or not at all, the relationship be-
tween the employee and his union representative is compromised. It is
90 The determination whether a union representative is acting for himself or on be-
half of other employees is often a difficult question of fact. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gibbs
Corp., 284 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1960), discussed at text accompanying notes 112-15 infra.
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now the employee, rather than his representative, upon whom the
burden of maintaining a relationship rests.
Regardless of whether contract procedures are being used, or the
individual involved is a union officer, courts have been quick to link
individual with group activities. Thus the Third Circuit, in Mushroom
Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 91 required only that for activity to be
"concerted" it be engaged in "with the object of initiating or inducing
or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group
action in the interest of the employees." 9 The Ninth Circuit, applying
this test, held that a single employee's verbal support of a threatened
strike by the union was protected concerted activity and that the
employee's discharge violated his section 7 rights.93 Further, in NLRB
v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op.,9 4 the Sixth Circuit protected an
employee who acted, without actual authority, as an informal spokes-
man for other employees. In holding that the employee's right to com-
plain about the qualifications of a new foreman was protected, the
court noted that the cohesiveness of "concerted activity" need not be
more than "a reasonable inference . . . that the men involved con-
sidered that they had a grievance and decided, among themselves
that they would take it up with management."9 5
Thus, in several contexts, courts have already departed from literal
enforcement of the in concert requirement. Activities undertaken
solely by individuals have been found to be "concerted" for the pur-
poses of section 7 under various tests and formulas. Consequently, the
suggestion that the Second Circuit's approach in Interboro is without
precedent is incorrect. The courts have stretched the meaning of "con-
certed activity" to accord with their conceptions of what Congress
meant by that phrase. It is surely only arbitrary to draw the interpre-
tative line short of Interboro's "constructive" approach.
A recent Eighth Circuit case, NLRB v. Century Broadcasting
Co.,"8 in applying the Interboro rationale to protect a single employee
in another context, also presents support for adoption of the Second
Circuit's approach. Taylor, sole engineer at a radio station, was em-
ployed under the terms of a bargaining agreement between his em-
ployer and the union. When Taylor attempted to press a demand for
overtime pay, pursuant to the contract, he met first with resistance
and subsequently with demotion. 7 Finding this to be a constructive
discharge, the trial examiner held that it was the result of his attempt
to enforce the overtime pay provision of the contract and of his warn-
91330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
92Id. at 685.
9 3 Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1968).
94 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960).
95 Id. at 12.
96419 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1969).
97 Id. at 780.
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ing that he would report the matter to the union. 98 The court, adopting
the reasoning of the trial examiner and citing Interboro as support,
held that since Taylor was the sole engineer at the radio station and
consequently "the bargaining unit" at the time of his discharge: "[H] e
acted in concert in his reliance on the collective bargaining con-
tract" and so was engaging in "concerted activities" for which he
was illegally discharged. 9
Although the court's opinion did not clearly differentiate between
the section 8(a) (1) and section 8(a) (3)100 violations in regard to
Taylor's discharge,' 0 ' its relevance lies in its reliance on Interboro in
finding Taylor's activities to be "concerted." Confronted with a situa-
tion in which an employee was the sole person to whom the relevant
provision of the bargaining agreement applied, the Eighth Circuit
found that activities so arising should be considered as "concerted"
per se and so within the protection of section 7. In effect, the court
formulated a type of "constructive" approach, similar to the one
utilized by the Second Circuit in Interboro.
No case is more important than Century Broadcasting in illustrat-
ing the serious issues with which the Second Circuit has attempted to
deal. In that case, the Eighth Circuit recognized that, to an employee
in Taylor's position, the denial of the Act's protection because of
circumstances beyond his control would negate a necessary and desir-
able aspect of employee self-help. Even if it is feasible for an employee
to process his claim through the union, there inevitably arise situa-
tions in which it is either impractical' 02 or otherwise undesirable'0 3 to
do so. Thus there is a need to preserve the interests of the individual
as against the too-often dominant interests of big business and big
unions. The Interboro approach may not be the best safeguard for
the interests of individual employees. But in adopting it, Century
Broadcasting at least reaffirmed the need for some such safeguard.
V. PROBLEmS OF THE THID CIRCUIT APPROACH
Traditional interpretations of section 7's concert requirement as
illustrated by Northern Metal have often led to outcomes satisfactory
98 Century Broadcasting Co., 1968 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 22,487.
9419 F.2d at 780.
100 "It shall be an unfair labor practise for an employer by discrimination in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization . . . " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
See generally Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Labor Act:
Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CoamzRNr L. REv. 491 (1967); Note,
The Requirement of "Concerted" Action under the NLRA, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 514, 524-26
(1953).
101 The court stated that discharge because of Taylor's concerted activities "discour-
aged union activities with respect to the contract and among employees generally." 419
F.2d at 780.
102E.g., NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
10 3 See text accompanying notes 1-15 supra.
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to neither employees nor employer. By using three illustrative cases as
focal points, problems in the traditional interpretation can best be ana-
lyzed.
The failure of the courts to afford protection to many individuals
with contract grievances has resulted in a serious "safety" problem.
Illinois Ruan Transport Corp. v. NLRB1°0 illustrates how vital infor-
mation may fail to reach appropriate personnel. In that case an
employee wrote to his employer concerning certain safety violations
of the collective bargaining agreement. Although the Eighth Circuit
did not find it necessary to decide "the close and difficult question of
whether Adams' alleged safety campaign constituted protected
concerted activity,"'10 5 it nevertheless stated that "many of these
[complaints] could not fall in the protected activity category.'
'10 6
The court's rationale for this statement was that the record showed
no support-from either fellow employees or the union-for many of
Adams' complaints and suggestions in regard to implementation of the
safety provisions of the contract. 10 7 Adams' grievances may not all
have been valid. Yet a court's reliance on the lack of group support
may not be a desirable prerequisite on which to premise either their
investigation or the protection accorded to the complainant. While
such a view may tend to screen "bad faith" grievances made for purely
personal reasons, it does so at the expense of discouraging other em-
ployees from reporting safety violations and other dangerous condi-
tions of employment. 0
In Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 0 9 decided by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, an employee's writing to the state department of health
with regard to unsanitary conditions at her employer's premises was
held to be protected under the Act-but only because the court de-
clined to reject the Board's determination" that other employees had
approved the letter."' The court, in supporting the Board, was willing
to find the necessary element of concert only in the context of group
approval, not in a context of individual enforcement of collective
rights. Walls Mfg. thus provides a useful example of how strict ad-
herence to the concert requirement may prevent information regard-
ing possibly dangerous or unhealthy working conditions from being
transmitted to appropriate regulatory agencies. This situation, poten-
104 404 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1968).
105 The court found that the employee's discharge was not motivated by such ac-
tivity. Id. at 276.
106 Id.
1
0 7 Id.
108 See, e.g., J.A. Ferguson Constr. Co., 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 20,112; Inter-
boro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1965).
109321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
o10 The court cited its narrow scope of review as justification. Id. at 754. See Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
111 Walls Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.RB. 487 (1960).
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tially as serious for the individual employee as that found in Illinois
Ruan Transport, is a measure of the extent to which safety issues can
be raised by given interpretations of the law.
The court's adherence to the concert requirement has led, as well,
to considerable inequity among employees generally. In NLRB v.
Gibbs Corp.,"2 the discharged employee held the position of "shop
steward"-the employee responsible for presenting the grievances of
other employees to the employer under the bargaining agreement. The
case turned on the question whether the shop steward was acting for
other employees, or solely for his own benefit, in presenting to the em-
ployer a series of grievances concerning seniority rights under the
contract. After several such actions by the steward, he received notice
of his dismissal. The employer argued that no violation of section
8(a) (1) had occurred because the employee was discharged only as a
result of his being an "habitual nuisance." 113
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit adopted the trial examiner's
report, finding the immediate cause of the discharge to be the assertion
of a grievance "which related solely to a personal gripe" of the stew-
ard.1 4 Consequently, the court held that the employer's action did not
constitute a violation of the Act since the steward's activities were not
"concerted. ' 5
A comparison between Gibbs and the previously discussed opinion
of the Seventh Circuit in Thor Power Tools16 reveals the inequity of
such a result. In the Seventh Circuit case, a union grievance commit-
teeman's remarks in representing an employee were found to be pro-
tected under the Act.1 7 Thus the court's current interpretation of
section 7's scope poses a severe dilemma for an employee acting in
such a capacity. While he is accorded the Act's protection in attempt-
ing to process other employees' contract grievances, he is not granted
such protection when attempting to prosecute his own claim in the
same manner. This "unequal protection" problem effectively places
certain employees in a difficult position. Obviously it denies them a
practical access to their employer to resolve personal contract claims.
But, as well, it places their position as employees in jeopardy, should
a reviewing court misconstrue their prosecution of others' grievances
as their own. Such a dilemma may well dictate a reevaluation of the
law in this area along the lines which Interboro has constructed.
112 284 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1960).
.11Id. at 404. Both parties agreed that the grounds asserted by the employer for the
discharge were truly the grounds for dismissal. The dispute concerned whether the steward
was a "nuisance" because of his contract demands on behalf of himself (the employer's
position) or because of his demands on behalf of other employees. Id.
114Id. at 408.
115Id. at 406.
116See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
117The Fifth Circuit has recognized the same principle. See note 90 supra & accom-
panying text.
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The principal problem which the traditional approach to section
7 entails, however, involves the discouragement of legitimate employee
protest. The failure to protect employee activity at its first stages
serves to frustrate much "true" concerted activity.118 Further, as to
the specific problem of individual enforcement of contract rights, the
problem takes on an even more ominous character. If an individual
must place his security in jeopardy by trying to induce group action
to support a grievance-"9 and is prohibited from presenting his com-
plaint on his own, 20 his opportunity to communicate with his employer
has effectively been denied.
Davis' position in Northern Metal was perhaps somewhat unusual
in that he, unlike most employees, was not entitled to union represen-
tation in the prosecution of his grievance. Although this factor may
have some relevance, its significance is severely limited by other con-
siderations. Even an employee entitled to union representation may not,
for various reasons, obtain the help or attention his grievance deserves.
Furthermore, the pervasive problem of "sweetheart contracts" reduces
the significance of this factor even further.'
2
1
An unknown percentage of employers enter into collusive bar-
gaining agreements with unions which nullify their employees' right to
process grievances. 2 In fact, since the bargaining agreement nego-
tiated by the Northern Metal Company with the union denied any
grievance recourse to probationary employees, it may have been a
form of "sweetheart contract." Certainly, it presents many of the
same problems which a genuinely collusive agreement would involve.
Thus, the situation there, although it perhaps represents an extreme
example, serves to reveal the potential problems of the individual
complainant and hence provides a model which highlights the inequities
of the present law.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The "constructive" approach to the "concerted activities" ques-
tion goes far toward diminishing the inequities and dangers of the
118See, e.g., NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir. 1953)
(griping by employee to other employees held not to be protected activity, though in a
sense aimed at group action, because it was "far too 'inchoate'"); Joanna Cotton Mills
Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949) (employee's circulating petition on behalf of
"personal" grievance held not to be protected; court did not consider possibility that
other employees may have had same grievance); Note, Discharge for Griping as an Un-
fair Labor Practice, 62 YALE L.J. 1263 (1953).
119E.g., Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964); NLRB
v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1953).
120 See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
121 See, e.g., Sperry v. Retail Clerks Local 782, 202 F. Supp. 708, 710 (W.D. Mo.
1962).
122 Employers faced with legitimate organization by a union ... will all too
frequently shop for an organization which will enter into a contract with them
at little or no cost in terms of employee benefit, in return for either an outright
payment of cash, or in return for a check-off and/or welfare and pension fund
contributions.
Vladeck, Collusive Practises in Labor-Management Relations, 12 N.Y.U. ANN. CoN' ON
LABOR 103 (1953).
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more traditional, Third Circuit approach. It implicitly recognizes the
inconsistency of telling an employee that his assertion of a contract
claim will be protected only if certain, often irrelevant, standards are
met. By making "concerted purposes" the touchstone, it attempts to
apply an interpretation of section 7 which at once accords with an
"enlightened" policy view and remains at least arguably within the
language of the Act.
In most respects, this attempt is successful. Interboro grants pro-
tection to advocates whose legitimate contract claims might otherwise
go unexpressed. It de-emphasizes the technicalities of the process used
to express a grievance and focuses instead upon the substantive effect
which a complaint will have through enforcement of the bargaining
agreement. Finally, it challenges, at least in part, the arbitrary dis-
tinction between one and two grievants upon which has often turned
the remedial action taken by the courts. At the same time, however,
the "constructive" approach does not foresake the "concerted activi-
ties" requirement of section 7. Although it does apply something
other than a literal interpretation of that provision, the courts have
acted similarly in other contexts. Both the "union co-grievant" theory
suggested by Selwyn Shoe and Trailmobile, and the "inducement" test
of Mushroom Transportation, are examples of constructions of the
"concerted activity" language to encompass situations where policy
dictated extending the Act's protection to individual grievants. The
rationale used to justify the Second Circuit's decision in Interboro is,
arguably, only an extension of this process.
The "constructive" approach presents an additional problem, how-
ever. Following Interboro might encourage individuals in large num-
bers to bypass the contractually prescribed grievance procedure
without good reason. Judge Biggs' assertion in his dissent in Northern
Metal that where an employee is entitled to union representation "he
would undoubtedly request the union to process his grievance"'123
seems too broadly generalized a conclusion. Indeed, the inaccuracy of
such a view is suggested by the recent actions of black union members
who, feeling that their grievances have not been treated seriously by
white union leaders,.24 have begun to challenge "discriminatory prac-
tices and complacent labor bureaucracies.' 25 Under Interboro, an
ever larger number of black workers might fail to process their griev-
ances through the union machinery and so produce a substantial
strain on the collective bargaining system. Although such an outcome
is not inevitable, it at least bears careful consideration.
In another sense, however, this consideration is more academic
123 440 F.2d at 888.
32 4 The unions have uniformly denied such charges. In a recent study, for example,
"the UAW [United Auto Workers] took strong exception to the allegations that it was
not adequately representing the black workers in connection with grievances and other
complaints." Stetson, Negro Members are Challenging Union Leaders, N.Y. Times, June
29, 1969, at 37, col. 2.
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than real. The fact that it is desirable to prevent single employees
from subverting the established grievance process becomes consider-
ably less significant when considered with the fact that two employees,
acting together, can usually subvert that process at will. Consequently,
the underlying problem with which Interboro attempts to deal may
require not simply the kind of ad hoc solution which the "constructive"
approach represents, but rather a more searching examination of the
concert requirement as a concept.
While the legislative history is unrevealing as to the purposes for
which Congress inserted the "concerted activities" provision in section
7,12 6 several alternatives, as discussed by previous commentators,
1 27
are conceivable. First, the phrase may represent a legislative deter-
mination that the conduct of an individual is likely to be too insignifi-
cant to merit governmental protection. That is, Congress may have
believed that the authority of the Board should be focused on those
activities of sufficient importance to involve the participation of more
than one person. To do otherwise may have been viewed as an un-
necessary waste of limited resources. Second, Congress may have
denied protection to individual activity to provide an incentive for
workers to combine in expressing their grievances. This would help
provide stronger labor organizations capable of counterbalancing the
power of the corporate employer. If employees were able to prosecute
their own grievances, the incentive for supporting the union would
decrease proportionately.2 8
Both of these possible purposes have little relevance today. Many
businesses are either small enough, or employ so heterogeneous a
group of workers that a single employee's action may be highly sig-
nificant and worthy of consideration. Further, the need to encourage
the growth of strong labor unions has since passed. Modern conditions
elicit at least as much a need to shield the individual from the collec-
tive force as to protect the individual from the employer by means of
a strong union. Thus, the reasons which probably underlay Congress'
insertion of the concert provision in 1935 are today largely displaced
by very different considerations. 29
The best interests of labor would be served if the legislature
deleted the requirement of "concerted activity" from section 7. The
courts' reluctance to construe that provision literally, as well as their
attempts to broaden the ambit of section 7's protection, are persuasive
indications that the literal meaning of that section is unrealistic. Fur-
thermore, retention of the "mutual aid or protection" language would
126 See, e.g., S. Res. No. 573, 74 Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). See generally Reilly, The
Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEo. WAsHr. L. REv. 285 (1960).
127 E.g., Note, The Requirement of "Concerted" Action Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM.
L. REv. 514 (1953).
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still insure that the Act's scope would not be extended to activities
whose significance was limited to individuals. On balance, the basic
policy of industrial peace underlying the Act would best be served by
such a change.
